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THOUGHTS ABOUT THE FREEDOM OF CONSCIENCE AND RELIGION1

by Tamas Foldesi
Dr. Tamas Foldesi (Marxist) is the dean and professor of the philosophy of
law of the Law School, Eotvos Lorand University, Budapest, Hungary. This paper
was delivered as the main Marxist paper at the Second International Conference on
Ways to Promote the 198 1 U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, "Building Understanding
and Respect between People of Diverse Religions or Beliefs," Warsaw, Poland, May
15, 198 9. This edited version of that speech is printed with Prof. Foldesi's
permission. A previous article of his was published in OPREE, Vol. 9, No. I. He has
written many books and articles and may be regarded as one of the most prominent
humanist Marxist thinkers in the area of human rights.

I.
The Limitation of the Freedom of Religion and Its Ideology
I published a book on human rights in Hungary in January 1989. The basic conclusion
of the book was that the implementation of human rights in Eastern Europe has been
characterized by fundamental contradictions and discrepancies during the long historic period
dominated by a one-party system, especially in the sphere of the so-called "rights to political
freedom." The main contradiction is this: On the one hand, human rights in these countries
have been declared basic values which form an integral part of the constitution and the actual
exercise of human rights is officially evaluated as- being basically (and increasingly) in
harmony with the declared principles. On the other hand, as a necessary consequence of the
single-party system, the political part of human rights--the rights of association, assembly,
speech, press, and others--are strictly limited, and, in fact, are not being implemented.
In this paper I wish to explore whether the large-scale limitation of human rights had
affected the freedom of conscience and religion, and if so, to what extent. In addition, I will
also review the ideological justifications of the limitation of the rights of conscience and
religion and which are its debatable, and for me, unacceptable propositions. The analysis is

1A shortened version of the author's study published under the same title.
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primarily done on the basis of the Hur:tgarian experiences with an occasional look at the
developments in other East European countries.
In relation to the rights of conscience and religion can one trace the duality that
characterized the general situation of human rights in Eastern Europe?
above contradiction evidently exists:

One side of the

similarly to all other human rights, the rights of

conscience and religion are among the declared basic values listed in constitutions (although
not all of the human rights listed in the 1948 and 1966 U.N. Human Rights Declarations are
included in the East European constitutions). In regard to their implementation the answer
given was definitely positive.

This attitude was typically characterized by the positions

adopted by the congresses of the Hungarian Socialist. Worker's Party [the Communist Party
of Hungary] which were repeated almost as stereotypes after 1956, declaring that in Hungary
the right to religion was fully implemented, that relations between the state and the churches
were reliably settled, and that the · churches operated in an autonomous manner. 2
With regard to the other side of the contradiction, at first glance it seems the question has
to be answered negatively.

Since no other real political parties could exist under the

conditions of the one-party system, they, as a consequence, could not have their own press,
and so forth. In Eastern Europe (except in Albania) different churches did exist legally, and
they did have the right to hold religious festivities and to publish books and newspapers
within certain limits. In contrast to the 1950s--at least in Hungary--the citizens could freely
attend religious ceremonies without suffering disadvantages; for instance, their children could
attend religious educational courses.
However, the situation is different when the realization of the freedom of conscience and
religion is evaluated within the framework of human rights as a whole.

It is a part, an

integral part of human rights--as the essence of the right of equality and freedom--that the
system of political institutions should provide an opportunity for different social movements
to forin organizations, to express their ideas, ideologies, and should not hinder the creation
of realistic competition among them.

Only so can citizens be ensured that by studying

different ideas, views, and trends, they can decide for themselves which political concepts
and organizations they may want to support, what ideologies, philosophical and ethical
concepts they want to accept or reject. In other words, human rights definitely include a
relative equality of chances, for only then can human rights fulfil their basic function that
individuals within a society may extend their personality.

Only when they know the

alternatives can they select from among the different political, ideological, and other values.
However, this equality of chances did not really exist in countries of Eastern Europe.

2See. the congressional reports of the 9th, lOth, lith, 12th, 13th Congresses of the Hungarian
·
Socialist Worker's Party between 1967 and ·1985.
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Although the churches could operate and religion could exist in a legal manner their
opportunities were severely limited.
An overall characteristics of the limitations of the freedom of conscience and religion was
that from the second half of the 1940s, in the majority of the East European countries, a
system of conditions was established where the activity of the churches was actually forced
into a narrowly set framework very different from the opportunities available for the spread
of the Marxist ideology.

The opportunities were first limited when the East European

political systems were turned from a pluralistic to a monolithic form where the vast majority
of the organizations that did not form the so-called "transmission belts" of the ruling
communist parties were eliminated or else their operation was reduced to a formality.
Religious clubs and associations, including their youth sections, were eliminated during that
period and they could not be reorganized for decades.

This included, in Hungary, the

abolishment of the monastic orders (Law No. 34/1950), and only a few of the schools owned
and operated by the churches were allowed to carry on their activities.
On the level of education the most characteristic example of the inequality of chances
was in schools. Especially in secondary schools and institutions of higher education (with the
exception of church-run secondary schools and theological schools), education is carried out
strictly in the atheist spirit; the curricular materials in the social sciences are based on
Marxism, and classes in Marxism are obligatory at colleges and universities.
The limitation of the right to religion is also expressed in Hungary and the majority of
the East European countries by the fact that up to very recently the means of mass
communications were available to the Churches only to an extremely limited extent. This
practice ·evidently expressed the concept that the spread of religious ideas through such
channels was not desired.
The significant limitation of religious activities was also expressed by the fact that the
autonomy of the churches was far more relative than what could be considered compatible
with the freedom of religion. However, the majority of the East European countries have
implemented legal regulations that considerably obscure autonomy, expressing a monolithic
attitude that all organizations that do not serve the expression of the policy pursued by the
Communist Parties--except for sports organizations--should not be trusted. The churches
are obligated to inform the State Office for Church Affairs of all their more significant
actions, plans, and ideas. In its own right the State Office for Church Affairs has a say in
the appointment of Church dignitaries, and it often makes its own suggestions. Far from
being complete, this list clearly s·hows that this is not a case of occasional, incidental
limitation of the right of religion but a phenomenon that can be observed on a wide scale.
The basic reason for the different implementation of the rights of conscience and religion
is that a monolithic political structure only considers its own ideology--the spread of
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Marxism-Leninism--to be an indispensable means of social development, presuming that this
was identical to the objective interests of the people, especially of the future generations.
In this respect, in principle, the churches and religions are in the same category as the
organizations and ·their ideologies which maintain platforms different from those of the
ruling party. They are both unwanted competitors. Their activities should be limited or
banned in the interest of mafiitaining power, since their ideas objectively--and occasionally
subjectively, too--represent (or may represent) trends which differ from socialism.
However, the significant difference is that while a monolithic structure--despite several,
already explained negative consequences even during a longer historic period--may allow
itself to govern without competitors, it cannot take the same route toward the churches and
denominations. Due to historic reasons and traditions the social requirements and needs of
people expres�ed in their religions must be tolerated to a certain extent.
Therefore, the churches and religions appear as a "necessary evil" in the monolithic East
European systems. However, ''necessary evil" is a deeply and basically contradictory category.
Simultaneously it recognizes the necessity of a group· of phenomena which "unfortunately"
cannot be eliminated or eradicated from amongst general social phenomena, but at the same
time their social role should be completely or partly obstructed.
The objective contradiction has a two-way effect. On the one hand if something is evil,
its activities or opportunities should be limited.

One must change the necessary into

unnecessary. "Ne cessary . evil" is not very different from "unnecessary evil." The idea of
.
"unnecessary evil" affects not only all the churches and religions as complex phenomena (as
in the case of Albania) but "only" some of its organs, (e.g. the abolishment of the monastic
orders, and associations). On the other hand, if the churches and religions are necessary-
taking social-historic realities into consideration--endeavors are made to use, as much as
possible, the churches and religions in the interest of the system. This is the root of the
endeavors to establish certain forms of political cooperation, which in some countries may
even reach a stage of alliance and may be extended to cooperation to handle certain negative
phenomena of society (such as the struggle against social maladjustment) or to the support
of dialogues (although dialogues reflect a somewhat ·different mentality on behalf of
Marxism).
All this is historically further complicated by the fact that the churches and religions-
although their social-historic role was very diverse and contradictory--were closely related
both financially and intellectually to the bourgeois societies, and therefore, during the social
changes that took place in Eastern Europe following the Second World War, there was a
significant conflict of interests between the new social order and at least a part of the
churches and religions in connection with their earlier status and position (for example, the
problems of the hind distribution). Similarly, in the majority of the East European countries,
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with the exception of Czechoslovakia, bourgeois· democracy only had a minor influence.
Several feudal remnants still existed (despite the bourgeois requirements) and, as a result, the
state and the churches were not separated consistently.

Consequently, the freedom of

religion and conscience was implemented to a limited degree. (Merely two examples: Before
World War II, only in Czechoslovakia was it possible for someone to declare himself/herself
not belonging to any Church or religion without most serious social consequences. Another
characteristic example was in Hungary, for instance, where prior to World War II church
taxes were collected as public taxes and one had to belong to a church or denomination.)
To consider religions and Churches as a "necessary evil" brings about a similar collision
of values as in the case of . "rights to political freedom."

In my book, I endeavored to

document that classic political human rights--within the framework of a dogmatic concept
-conflicts with the maintenance of power and the building of monolithically conceived
socialism. The "solution" of the presumed collision is that the maintenance of power, the
"building of socialism" is a more important interest than are the classic political human rights.
This legitimated their long- lasting limitation well beyond the periods of the cult of
personality.
In the case of the freedom of conscience and religion the contradiction is between this
groups of human rights and the general Marxist-Leninist ideology which would have to be
accepted by practically all.

The latter is considered politically to be a basic ideological

condition for the completion of socialist construction. There is no doubt that within the
framework of a monolithic concept the freedom of religion and conscience must, relatively,
succumb in a conflict of values. If the limitation of the freedom of religion and conscience
is the price to be paid for the increasingly successful and wide-ranging spread of the Marxist
ideology, this sacrifice is worth the effort even if, in a similar manner to the limitation of
the "political human rights," it provides a platform for criticisms of various types and
motivations, since it results in a contradiction between the declared principles and the actual
practice.
So far we have studied the political motivations of the partial limitation of the freedom
of religion and conscience.

However, limitations have not only political sources but

ideological roots as well. In Eastern Europe the Marxist ideology dealing with the criticism
of religion provided a theoretical basis for the foundation of such limitation. However, in
this respect, at least in Hungary, there was a significant difference between the views of two
groups of critics. The first groups of the Marxist critics of religion continued, in somewhat
refined form, the simplistic concepts about church and religion which were formulated in
the 1950s.
·

The members of this group agreed with such limitations and aimed at the

conscious ideological foundation for the continued necessity of religion. Nevertheless, there
was also a more progressive trend whose members endeavored to elaborate a more nuanced
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picture in order to create a theoretical basis for practical cooperation that, based on
agreements between the state and the churches, were gradually implemented in policy and
several areas of everyday life. The activity of the second trend created the preconditions for
the organization of dialogues. As of the 1980s some significant dialogues took place. At the
same time one must add that the representatives of this group also considered the limitation
of the freedom of religion and the · struggle against religion to be necessary, but they placed
a far greater emphasis on political cooperation and dialogue with the churches.
The representatives of the more conservative criticism of religion in essence based their
concept concerning the justification of the limitation of religious freedom on three
ar·guments.

However, one must note that the actual fact of limitation has never been

acknowledged by either group of the Marxist critics of religion, but the logical consequence
of their reasoning reflected a trend leading towards limitation.
The first basis is the evaluation of the truth content of religious teachings saying that in
a peculiar way they considerably deter people from reality. The result was that religion is·
considered a false consciousness strongly contradicting !;ciences which reflect reality in a true
manner. But they meant not only the sciences. Marxism, as the "sole scientific ideology,"
was declared to be a specific branch of science. The conclusion of the two combined was
that in education, science must be given.. a "green light," and Marxism, as a scientific
ideology, should be given priority, so much so, that, as far as possible, it must be ensured a
monopoly situation. Religious views, however, should be excluded from the classrooms and
education. At best religion is to be the subject of criticism in classroom. (Its fate should be
analogous to those pseudo-sciences that should be eliminated from the curricula as much as
possible.)
The "objective" contradiction between the "falseness" of religion and the "truth" of
Marxism is the basis of the so-called ideological class struggle, which--despite their similar
features--significantly differs from the economic and political forms of class struggle. In the
case of the latter two there may also be an identity of interests in addition to the conflict of
interests, which enables economic and political coexistence. But truth and fallacy rule out
one. another. Therefore, both coexistence and convergence are impossible on the "ideological
front."

According to Pal Foldi "the relationship between science and religion is

irreconcilable," and in essence the same holds true for Marxism-Leninism. "The party is a
vanguard; its ideology is Marxist-Leninism which contradicts all sorts of bourgeois, petit
bourgeois, religious ideologies."3

3Pal Foldi, Egyhaspolitika es vallaskritika [Religious Policy and the Criticism of Religion]
(Budapest: Kossuth Publishing House, 1 975), pp. 47 and 6.
6

The second basis for the limitation of the rights of conscience and religion was the
unilateral evaluation of the social-historic role olayed by religion which is closely related to
the first root. If religious views were the specific appearance of false consciousness and at
the same time the most significant obstacles to the spread of Marxism-Leninism as the real
ideology, their social role must necessarily be reactionary. conservative. In the case of the
dogmatic evaluation of religion the reactionary nature of religion is based historically. The
theoretical starting point is the role played by religion in class society, which is
unambiguously negative, according to this evaluation.
A basic feature of the dogmatic concept is that this simplified historical evaluation is
transferred, almost as is, to the present-day conditions.

The class content of religion

generally does not change under the conditions of "socialism," under the presumptions that
Marxism-Leninism remains the ideology· of the most progressive social class, the working
class (it may be extended to that of "the people"), necessarily opposing religion which reflects
petit-bourgeois attitudes. "The religious ideology is incompatible with the socialist ideology;
they stem from different roots. So much so that the gap even widens(!!)"
Similarly "in socialism religious morals are just as unacceptable as the bourgeois, petit
bourgeois morals."4 From all of this the conclusion is evident: "The interest and task of man
building socialist, communist society is to get rid of the shackles of religion."
The third reasoning is based on the alleged practice of "socialism" which ,according to
this supposition, fully proves the validity of policy of the restriction of the freedom of
religion. According to the representatives of the dogmatic criticism of religion "socialist
consciousness" and the "trend of influence" of the individual religions reflect a contrasting
change. While the first gradually strengthens, the second permanently fades in a proportional
manner. The reasons for the contrasting phenomenon--since this is a special reflection-
are considered to be that "socialism" provides an ever increasing opportunity for human self
attainment. They believe that it is increasingly proven that the "liberated human being" is
capable of directing his or her society and himself or herself, and therefore, will decreasingly
rely on the "crutches of religion." Again, according to Pal Foldi, "with the leadership of the
working class and our society's political unity, concord is constantly strengthened" and
simultaneously with it "socialist consciousness" is implemented on an increasingly wide scale.
As a counterpoint "religion becomes gradually groundless and will fade away in the socialist
society."5

4Ibid., pp. 6, 7, and 56.
5Ibid., pp. 6, 8, 40, and 56. The length of this short study makes it impossible to deal in detail
with the views of the Hungarian, Czechoslovak, Soviet, and other authors who discuss, practically
in the same spirit, the question of truth-content of religion and Marxist ideas, the social role of
religions, the strengthening of "the socialist consciousness" and the weakening of religion. Therefore,
7

The more progressive Hungarian critics of religion represent a far more varied stand on
these issues. This concept may generally be characterized by the inclusion of both of the
previous elements in a partial form as well as realistic features that stand far closer to the
truth.

By way of illustration let us quote a few thoughts by Jozsef Lukacs, who was a

leading proponent of the progressive criticism of religion.
In the works of J6zsef Lukacs one can find the idea that "religions may be differentiated
from plain mistakes by the role they play in promoting the development of historic necessity
and social development".6 At the same time, elsewhere he refines this concept by s�ating that
.
in certain respects religion also includes correct views.7 In another work he already
differentiates between religious views and religious ideology. While on the level of views he
considers religions and Marxism incompatible, with regard to ideologies he states that they
do not rule out one another in all aspects and even lists those very important features, from
the preservation of peace to honesty and loyalty, which converge. 8
The difference between the progressive and regressive criticisms of religion is further
emphasized in the evaluation of the social role played by religions.

This is primarily

expressed in that, according to J. Lukacs, the progressive and revolutionary endeavors may ·
also appear in religions; they may inspire cultural development.9 In harmony with this he
emphasized the alliance of the churches and the state, especially in regard to political and
cultural issues.
However, the remnants of the dogmatic concept also appear here. In this spirit J. Lukacs
writes that the religions in the countries of Eastern Europe have a bourgeois, petit-bourgeois
content, and the "class struggle presumes a break with religion" although the extent of that

here I will only list a few works: Sandor Urban, Egyhaz es allam [Church and State], (Budapest:
Kossuth Publishers, 1962.); Y. Yaroslavsky: A kommunistak es a vallas [The Communists and
Religion], (Budapest: Kossuth Publishers, 1965); I. A. Galiczkaja: Gondolatok a vallasr6l [Thoughts
About Religion] (Budapest: Kossuth Publishers, 1964); J. Koszely, A modern egyhaz es a vallas [The
Modern Church and Religion], (Budapest: Kossuth Publishers, 1975); J. Kanskiy: Erkolcs es vallas
[Morals and Religion], (Bratislava, 1962).
61. Lukacs, Tortenelem. filoz6fia. vallasossag [History, Philosophy, Religion]. (Budapest: Gondolat
Publishers, 1979), p. 92.

7Ibid., p. 302.
81.

p. 285.

Lukacs: Eszmek es valasztasok [Notions and Choices], (Budapest: Gondolat Publishers, 1988),

9Ibid., pp. 280-28 1 .
8

breakaway

varied historically.

supplementation.

In addition, "socialism

did not

require religious

nlO

With regard to the situation and future of religion in the countries of Eastern Europe,
according to the more progressive criticisms of religion, as a result of the alienation
experienced in "socialism," religion will continue to play an important role and maintain its
influence for a longer period of time. The representatives of this view also agree that with
·
the progress of the "construction of socialism" the social bases of religion decrease.
According to J. Lukacs "the conclusive evidence against religion is provided by history."11
However, more important is that in conclusion even the more progressive criticisms of
religion evaluate the relations between the state and the churches, and Marxism and religion,
from a position of power. In this spirit there is a basic agreement among its proponents that
the freedom of religion is sufficiently implemented and that the relations between the state
and the Churches are satisfactorily settled. 12

II

The Concept Requiring the Elimination of the Freedom
of Conscience and Religion

I think it has been already made clear that my standpoint differs on a number of issues,
not only from the dogmatic concept of the criticism of religion, but even from the more
progressive Marxist theories on religion. Primarily, I maintain that similarly to all other
human rights, in all of their complexity, the consistent implementation of the rights of

10J. Lukacs, Tortenelem. filoz6fia. vallasossag, pp. 259 and 262.
11Ibid., p. 305.
12In my longer study on the rights of religion a�d conscience I have analyzed in detail the
theoretical roots of the above described concepts. The roots include the views expressed by the
classics of Marxism, their strongly anti-religious stand, although one can also show that the dogmatic
critics of religion have significantly simplified the views of Marx, Engels and Lenin on religion.
Among the roots the enlightenment of the Age of Enlightenment also played a role which continues
even today along with the concepts and practice of the Soviet Union and other East European
countries concerning the churches and religion. These cannot be discussed here in detail because of
the lack of space.
9

freedom of conscience and religion is one of the basic tasks of the near future. I do not
agree that · the situation in regard to the freedom of conscience and religion was satisfactory
in Hungary although I do not reject the partial results and relative successes, especially when
compared to certain other countries of Eastern Europe. The relatively good relationship
between the state and the · churches, the "settled" nature of the situation cannot hide that this
is not a relationship of equal parties who mutually promote their interests, but one reflecting
an unequal power relationship and a monolithic attitude that require correction in the spirit
of the consistent implementation of human rights.
Furthermore, while I primarily disagree with the reasoning of the d.ogmatic criticism of
religion, I also disagree with the similar views of the more progressive concept of the
criticism of religion. My counter-argument is as follows:
I think that the coupling of religions with false consciousness and contrasting it ·with
Marxism as the scientific truth is basically questionable. The comparison of the values of the
religious ideologies and those of the Marxist ideology presumes the reliable disclosure of the
truth values of these concepts.
· But can one· unequivocally determine the truth value of the contrasting ideological
statements and concepts? Has it really been unequivocally decided and proven that God does
.

.

not exist, that the world is eternal and endless? I think that so fa:r we have not been able to
find an answer to this cardinal problem of the contradictory ideologies that would have been
logically oroven in an exact scientific manner or whose antithesis had been rejected.
The more progressive critics of religion within Marxism endeavored to overcome this
wh �le complex of problems by a specific shifting of the emphasis, j ustly emphasizing that
the essence of Marxism was not atheism, but the human being and social philosophy, and that
the seed of atheism was not negation but a benevolent humanistic ideology.
In my view this is the only possible route for Marxism. At the same time this evaluation
of atheism is a special retreat in this sphere. The collision of the religious concept and the
Marxist ideas does not primarily concern the belief in God and atheism but has transferred
to the sphere of ideology, to. the fields of society, human concerns, and ethics. 13
However, if atheism, even in a reduced way, remains a part of Marxism it must be
acknowledged that the Marxist concepts concerning atheism do not oppose the partially or
completely unscientific nature of religious belief because they are scientific, but, in the best
case, as a probable (perhaps of a greater level of probability) hypothesis opposed to another
assumption. In this sense the real gap or cleavage is not between "science and atheism" and
"unscientific religious belief," but between the sciences (especially natural sciences) and the

13 It is not a coincidence that due to this several West European and South American Communist
Parties consider party membership and religious belief compatible.
10

philosophical approaches, the latter of which include both the materialist and idealist
(theological) approaches. 14
As a result, the justification or legitimation of either the religious or the Marxist
ideologies are not decided by their seemingly undeterminable truth content, but that they
fulfil determined social needs and that they are a source of motivation for actions and for
taking a stand. It is a self-conceit by Marxism to state that the relationship between the two
ideologies is basically ·characterized by the dichotomy of true and false.
The concept of the limitation of religious freedom is even more questionable if one adds
to the study the ideological sohere mentioned by J6zsef Lukacs. According to Lukacs's
terminology, ideologies, in contrast to. world outlook, "do not rule out one another in all
respects."
But if one takes a look at the issues where similarities in essential points of contact are
found it turns out that these are not only quantitatively numerous but are also qualitatively
basic issues.

Peace, truth, equality, love, consistent humanitarianism, respect for the

community, honesty, loyalty, the enrichment of the personality, and so forth form value
complexes that raise basic doubts concerning the notion of complete or essential ideological
opposition.

Especially when one takes into consideration that the social attitudes of a

significant portion of the churches in Eastern Europe gradually changed since the 1950s, the
elements (the questioning of revolution, the protection of private ownership) which
significantly differentiated religious ideologies from Marxism were forced in the background.
All this does not mean that as a result of the opposing ideological foundations significant
differences do not continue to exist.

However, it may confidently be stated that if

ideological discrepancies do not provide a sufficient justification for limiting the freedom
of religion, other ideological differences, which contain a number of significant similarities
and points of contact, should also not be used as a basis to justify such restrictions.
In the light of all this, the justification which utilizes the notion of the ideological class
struggle proves to be untenable. If the ideological class struggle's lack of compromise and
rejection of coexistence were based on the presumed incompatibility of "Weltanschauung"
(world outlook) and ideology and on an almost absolute opposition, another understanding
of the world outlook and ideologies must lead to a different conclusion when the premises
are changed.
If the ideological poles only embody different scales of probability, if a wide scale of
ideologies are provided for diverging and converging elements, one is justified to ask why

14 As a result I do not agree with the ideas of Marx or Lenin when they identify religious
teachings with superstition and obscurantism, because they do not correspond to reality.
11

should the at least partial cooperation and coexistence based on a dialogue be rejected in this
field when it has already been accepted in the economic and political fields.
As I have pointed out in another paper, the sharp differentiation between the norms of
the ideological class struggle and the rul �s of economic and political class struggle is
unfounded because coexistence acknowledged in the field of politics is based on values (such
as, for instance, the positive valuation of peace and truth) which have roots in ideology.
Thus, if the premise were true that ideologies are merely characterized by opposition, there
would be a lack of intellectual ammunition required by political cooperation. 15 The French
Marxist, M. Werret, is profoundly correct in writing that a Marxist would make himself or
herself poor if he or she were to isolate himself or herself from other cultural trends. "The
Marxist who thinks he has nothing to learn from Mauriac, Chagall, Fellini with regard to
man understands nothing of man, Christianity or Mar�ism."16 In addition, one is justified
to raise the question whether under the social conditions in the countries of Eastern Europe
it is realistic at all to presume the existence of a class struggle when the contradicting classes
had been eliminated decades ago and that sociological researchers have even questioned the
notion of the existence of classes that do not oppose o �e another.
Even the views. concerning the social function of religions and the churches failed to
provide a sufficient basis for restricting the freedom of religion. In my view the concept
expressed by the followers of the dogmatic criticis� of religion about the historic role played
by the churches and religions are tendentious and one-sided. I do not wish to deal here with
the notions concerning the past of religions and the churches since those cannot in fact
influence the judgments concerning the present. The only real reason for the restriction of
the freedom of religion could only be the current role played by.religions and the churches
and not their presumed reactionary activities in the past. 17 As far as the present is
concerned, I basically doubt the statement that the churches and religions are at best tolerated
companions whose social views and ethics are of a petit-bourgeois and/or bourgeois class
c_ontent and thus, in essence, retrogressive.

15Tamas Foldesi, "Bizhatnak e a vitapartnerek egymasban? Gondolatok a dialogusr61." [Can
Partners in Debate Trust One Another?
Thoughts About Dialogue], Vilagossag, (Budapest) No.
.
1/1987. pp. 24-30.
16M. Werret, A munkaspartok es a vallas [The Labor Parties and Religion]. (Budapest: Gondolat
Publishers, 1967).
17I think that the far more nuanced Marxist evaluations and analyses by the followers of the more
progressive criticism of religion provide a sufficient answer as to why the historic activities of the
churches and religions should not be viewed as only conservative.
12

However, it is indispensable for . the support of the foregoing statement to include the
third element which serves as the theoretical basis of the restrictions of religion, namely, the
criticism of its unrealistic evaluation of society. The criticism of the picture of the illusory
nature of religion which was drawn· by the dogmatic critics of religion may provide a real
basis for an endeavor to more realistically evaluate the social function of churches and
religions.
The repeated social crises in .the East European countries which reflect the basically
unsolved theoretical and practical problems of the economy, politics and public and private
morals, clearly prove that the presumption concerning the constant strengthening of the so
called "socialist consciousness" and the chronic weakening of religious influence (including
the moral spheres of this same issue) is in itself illusory and false.

Recently it has become

increasingly clear that despite certain partial. successes, the ruling ideas in Eastern Europe
(partly differing from one another) concerning socialism, such as the work of socialist
construction and even the stages, criteria, and tasks of the transition to communism, have
become problematic and que�tionable. They require a basic re-evaluation.
In connection with this, the. consciousness of most people is far from being socialist. One
should add here that the very criteria of the so-called "socialist consciousness" also requires
re-examination as to whether there was a need for such a category at all. In contrast to this,
according to the results of polls conducted in Hungary, despite the many restrictions the
churches and. religions have not only maintained their influence but even increased it. This
is true although contradictory processes are· going on in this sphere.

As a result of

secularization and for other reasons as well the number of deeply religious people have been
decreasing. (This is an international phenomenon, at least in Europe.)
However, the above does mean that the questionable basis of the restrictions of the
freedom of religion has been lost as a justification for these limitation which gave priority
to the development of socialis.m and the spread of "socialist consciousness."
If the further development of the East European societies were to continue in the spirit
of setting considerably new aims which include the basic role of democratic socialism or
democracy, humanism, justice, community spirit, and other traditional humanistic values, as
well as the aim of overcoming negative so
. cial phenomena, including those of the disturbances
resulting from social adaptation, then a significant role in their implementation is to be
played by the different religions and Churches, especially the larger ones. Not primarily
because of the principle, "if they could not be eliminated they should cooperate with us"
which was proclaime9 as the official policy thus far, but decidedly because these tasks,
which can be realized only with great. difficulty, require a wide-ranging social cooperation
which cannot be implemented without the assistance of the churches and religions. All this
is basically underscored by the fact that, on the one hand, these aims coincide, approach or
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touch upon the modern church and religious concepts on several points, while, on the other
hand, in a consistently democratic society it is an indispensable part of human rights that the
churches and religions should also have an unlimited opportunity to implement their social
and moral ideas.
In the light of all this, the statement seems untenable that (socialist) social progress is
diagonally contradictory to the growth of the church or religious influence since in their
content the two are contrary and, therefore, they may only develop to the detriment of one
another.

Placing the contradiction between a religious world outlook or ideology and

Marxism on a class basis is also unacceptable and anachronistic to a great extent.
If, however, the arguments of the dogmatic criticism of religion fail, there is even less
reason for the limitation of religious freedom based upon the far more realistic views
represented by the more progressive Marxist criticism of religion.·
However, this must lead to an unlimited implementation of human rights. In my paper
on human rights I reached the conclusion that a consistently. democratic, humanistic society
based on social equality and freedom (or at least leading in that direction) indispensably
requires--depending on the social conditions--the widest possible implementation of human
rights as its political, legal and moral basis·. Human rights, such as life worthy of the human
being, basic values required for the unfolding of the human personality, and the maintenance
of human dignity form an integral whole. The conscious violation of limitation of any one
will have serious consequences on the others and especially on the related groups. The basic
renewal of the East European societies, the democratic transformation of their political
system of institutions may only become a reality through the consistent implementation of
the political rights of freedom. And an integral part of that is the right of conscience and
religion.
An indispensable element of the political rights of

freedom is pluralism which is

expressed in the manifold level and character of the different institutions and systems of
ideas. The implementation of pluralism requires not only its formal declaration, but also the
equality of chances. The same must hold true for the right of conscience and religion: the
creation of equal opportunity and the elimination of the monopoly situation is indispensable.
The implementation of all this in Eastern Europe is a separate problem which is not easily
solved, since the effects of the restrictions which were introduced during the past decades
cannot be eliminated from one day to the next. However, the clarification and further
discussion of these .Questions of principle are mandatory for the success of their
implementation.
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